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NORTHCUTT ELY*

American Policy Options in the
Development of Undersea
Mineral Resources t
It is probable that the United States will soon face some fundamental choices in long-range policy with respect to undersea mineral
resources.
One significant approaching date is October 1967, when one of
the United Nations commissions will take up a pending Russian motion to create a working group to draft a convention to deal with
exploration and exploitation of mineral resources beneath the high
seas.' Another critical date is 1969, when consideration of revisions
* Member of the District of Columbia, California, and New York Bars.
A.B., J.D., Stanford University.
t Presented at the 90th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association,
Honolulu, Hawaii, at a Joint Program of the Sections of Mineral and Natural
Resources Law and International and Comparative Law, on "Developing the
Resources of the Sea," August 8, 1967.
1Between the delivery date of this paper, August 8, 1967, and the date of
publication, there have been some significant developments in the United Nations. The Russian proposal cited in the text (which had been submitted on
April 3, 1967, to the International Oceanographic Commission) proposed
that the Commission create a special working group to prepare a convention
"on the international norms of exploration and exploitation of the mineral
resources of the high seas." That Commission, on October 27, 1967, adopted
a more limited resolution establishing a "working group on legal questions
related to scientific investigations of the ocean." But on August 17, 1967,
the Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations proposed inclusion in
the agenda of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly an item
captioned "Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 2

11

C

216/

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf becomes in order,
at the end of the first five years of that Convention's operation.With respect to minerals beneath the sea, as with respect to
fishery resources and jurisdiction over the surface, dilemmas are presented to American policy-makers. Does self-interest propel us toward seaward expansion of the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States over the seabed, into deep waters at considerable distance from
our shores, even if this stimulates reciprocal preemption by other
coastal states of expanding margins of deep water seabeds off their
own shores? With respect to petroleum exploration and fishery controls, American policy already seems to be on a course of expansion
of coastal jurisdiction which is quite the opposite of the historic
American policy with respect to the surface.' There, we have always
insisted on a narrow limit on territorial waters.
peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources
in the interests of mankind." An explanatory memorandum proposed a treaty
which would declare that "the sea-bed and the ocean floor, underlying the
seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, are not subject to national appropriation in any manner whatsoever"; that the exploration of such
sea-bed shall be undertaken in a manner consistent with the Principles and
Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations; "the net financial benefits derived
from the use and exploitation of the sea-bed and of the ocean floor shall be
used primarily to promote the development of poor countries"; the sea-bed shall
be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes in perpetuity; and the proposed treaty should envisage the creation of an international agency "to assume jurisdiction, as a trustee for all countries, over the sea-bed and the ocean
floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction,"
and "to regulate, supervise and control all activities thereon." This proposal was
referred to the First Committee of the Assembly. It should be noted that in
the twenty-first Session the General Assembly, on December 8, 1966, had
adopted Resolution 2172 (XXI), "Resources of the Sea," directing the Secretary
General to undertake "a comprehensive survey of activities in marine science
and technology, including that relating to marine resources development," and
to submit at the twenty-third session "an expanded programme of international cooperation to assist in a better understanding of the marine environment through science and in the exploitation and development of marine resources, with due regard to the preservation of fish stocks."
2 Article 13 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf provides that request
for revision may be made five years after the Convention comes into force.
"The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps,
if any, to be taken in respect of such request." The Convention became
effective June 10, 1964, on ratification by the 22nd state.
3 As to petroleum, the Interior Department has issued permits for the drilling
of exploratory wells to explore the sediments underlying the ocean at a water
depth of 5,000 feet, at locations as far as 300 miles from the American coast.
However, the permit restricts penetration of the sediment to 1,000 feet (preInternational Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 2
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With respect to distant submarine mineral resources, which are
not contiguous to any state, shall we favor the concept that they belong
to no one, hence are open to competitive appropriation by all, or
shall we favor the concept that they belong to everyone, hence shall
be controlled and licensed out by some agency representing the
community of nations?
If so, what community? One which is made up of the few competing nations which have the means to exploit deep and distant
undersea resources? Or a community consisting of all the coastal
nations, including some undeveloped ones which might find it profitable to issue flags of convenience to the expeditions of foreign
licensees? Or a community made up of the land-locked nations as
well as the coastal states, i.e., the United Nations? ' Or some other
international agency created for this specific purpose?
Some of us believe that the American objective, for the next several years, should be to keep all options open, and avoid premature
commitments? Too little is known about these resources of the means
of exploiting them, to justify great decisions. But the initiative may
not be under our control.
By late 1967, in response to the Russian motion, or perhaps by
1969, in response to agitation for clarification of the Continental
Shelf Convention, the United States will quite possibly have to make
some policy commitments. ' These may not be irrevocable, but, once
made, they will be difficult to dissolve and recast.
sumably to avoid the likelihood of striking oil, hence triggering the "ex-

ploitability" clause of Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
although this is not stated). See Interior Department Press Release dated
May 26, 1967. As to fishery jurisdiction, see Public Law 89-658, of October 14,
1966, establishing a 12-mile exclusive fishery zone, contiguous to the territorial

sea.

4For excellent presentations of the case for exclusive United Nations jurisdiction over the bed of the high seas, see: Speech of Hon. Arvid Pardo,
Ambassador of Malta to the United Nations, before the General Assembly
November 1, 1967, in support of Malta's proposal for a treaty on this subject
(see Note 1, supra). See also statements of Francis T. Christy, Jr., and Clark
M. Eichelberger, before the American Bar Association's National Institute on

Marine Resources, Long Beach, California, June 8-10, 1967 (on press).
See statements of Professor William T. Burke and the present writer in
"Exploiting the Ocean" (Marine Technology Society, 1966), and before the
American Bar Association National Institute on Marine Resources, Long
Beach, California, June 8-10, 1967 (on press).
The proposal of Malta in the United Nations General Assembly, August 18,
1967 (Note I, supra), has, of course, injected an entirely new factor into the
time scale, since the date of presentation of this paper.
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 2

218/

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Moreover, it is conceivable that before the Convention comes up
for amendment in 1969, an American exploratory well, drilled in
depths of water several times 200 meters, and a long way from shore,
will strike oil. If this happens, it is foreseeable that American policy
will have to be crystallized very rapidly, and perhaps unilaterally,
as it was by President Truman's continental shelf proclamation in
1945.
The main policy problems fall into two groups:
I. How shall the seaward limit of the coastal state's exclusive
jurisdiction over the seabed be defined? This is the problem associated
with the potential 1969 revision of the Continental Shelf Convention.
II. Beyond that limit, howsoever defined, what regime shall
govern the exploration and exploitation of the minerals beneath the
high seas? This is the problem which may be associated with the
consideration of the Russian proposal in late 1967, although it is not
clear just what the Russians intended by it.
I.
As to the first of these, there has been considerable criticism of
definition in Article 1 of the Convention on the
third-dimensional
the
Continental Shelf, which reads "to a depth of 200 metres, or beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources." There are at least four troublesome things about this definition:
(1) Depths less than 200 meters exist off the coasts of California and Norway, for example, but separated from the shore by
very deep trenches. Does jurisdiction swoon in the trench and revive
farther at sea? If so, how far at sea? ' On shoals such as Frigate
Shoals, 400 miles from Hawaii?
7Such trenches exist off Norway and off the coast of California. Norway's
position "is that the Trough is only a depression in the shelf properly appertain"
ing to Norway, and that Norway is entitled to the full expanse of shelf ..
Young, "Offshore Claims and Problems in the North Sea," 59 Am. J. Intl. L.
505, 511 (1965). An agreement between Great Britain and Norway recognized Norway's right beyond this trench. The legal question, as to Norway's
rights under general principles of international law had Great Britain objected,
thus remains unanswered. Norway has not acceded to the Convention on the
Continental Shelf. As to the trench off California, the Interior Department's
Solicitor has issued an opinion that his Department's jurisdiction under the
Outer Continental Shelf Act supports its issuance of leases in areas some
50 miles from land, which are separated from the shore by depths which are
several times 200 meters.
International Lawyer,
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(2) The 200 meter isobath is criticized. Coastal nations have a
legitimate and growing interest in the continental slope, beyond this
depth. It is argued, also, that national security considerations work
against the 200 meter negative-contour line. It gives only meager
protection to exclusive American jurisdiction within a very narrow
band of the seabed, off some of our coasts. The line which establishes
the seaward limit of the coastal state's exclusive seabed jurisdiction,
like any fence, fences out as well as fencing in. It may be a very good
thing to move this fence outward.
(3) Exploration is now being carried on at depths much greater
than 200 meters, and exploitation will surely follow.8 The controlling
portion of the definition is therefore really its second part, relating to
exploitability "beyond that limit" of 200 meters. How far beyond?
To a depth which marches the coastal state's flag to sea until it meets
another, marching in the opposite direction? Rubber boundaries can
be guaranteed to cause trouble.
(4) If exploitation by a single nation of the contiguous seabottom "beyond that limit" of 200 meters is proved feasible, it is
arguable that the jurisdiction of all coastal nations all around the
globe is identically extended or deepened, whether exploitation at
that depth off their shores is physically feasible or not, and irrespective
of the differences in the economic feasibility of exploiting wholly
different minerals. This interpretation of the convention appears unconvincing, but it is earnestly argued by competent writers,9 and there
is some support for it in the legislative history of the Convention.
In short, a good case can be made for allegations that the
negative-contour concept is a cumbersome and indirect way to set a
meaningful lateral boundary, that the 200 meter isobath ignores the
interests of coastal nations in their continental slopes, beyond the
8 See Note 3, supra.
9 In addition, Professor Shigeru Oda in his June 9, 1967, speech at Long
Beach, California, states: "Each coastal State is, of course, free to grant to
any foreign country or foreign nationals the right to explore its continental
shelf or to exploit the natural resources therein contained. . .. Thus understood, the concept of exploitability must be interpreted each time in terms of
the most advanced standards of technology and economy in the world." See,
also, Krueger, "The Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Need for its
Revision," presented at Long Beach, California, June 9, 1967, at p. 9:
".. . the exploitability test of the Convention is an objective one, not a subjective one; if one country's technology is sufficient . . . every country's
continental shelf is so extended."
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 2
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continental shelf, and that the scheme of expansion by proof of exploitability is ambiguous.
Here we face a very old dilemma of another sort: It is easy to
second-guess, but can anyone suggest any scheme that is better, and
has as good a chance of world-wide acceptance? Whatever its defects,
the Convention's definition of coastal seabed jurisdiction, and the
accompanying boundary formulas, made possible a rapid crystallization of international law in a field which had been a vacuum twenty
years earlier. It brought about almost at once an orderly allocation of
jurisdiction in the North Sea,1" and its principles are being widely
observed, even by states which have not acceded to the Convention,
for example in the Persian Gulf."
But let us consider some alternatives. The Convention is obvian inventory
ously going to be revised at some time. We may need
2
of alternatives, if not by 1969, then not long thereafter.1
For example, it can be argued that a more precise and useful
concept would be that of a uniform lateral boundary of the coastal
state's seabed jurisdiction, irrespective of depth. It should be wide
enough to encompass all areas which are contiguous to the shore, and
to meet the requirements of the coastal state's national security.
Whether this uniform width should be 100, or 200, or more miles is
a matter for negotiation. If the concept of a negative-contour is
essential to nations which have very wide shelf areas, then let some
realistic depth be substituted for 200 meters. Or, combine the two
concepts, and let the coastal state's seabed jurisdiction extend to the
10 See Devaux-Charbonnel, "Today's Trends in Offshore Oil and Gas Legisla-

lation," World Petroleum, April 1967: "There are areas where agreements have
been concluded easily between certain coastal states, as in the North Sea." The
only difficulties in this area concern the concave shoreline belonging to Federal
Germany. Concerning this problem area, negotiations are being concluded
between Germany and Denmark on the one hand, Germany and the Netherlands on the other. See, also, Young, "Offshore Claims and Problems in the
North Sea," 59 Am. J. Intl. L. 505, 516 (1965).
11 Most of the Persian Gulf coastal countries have stipulated the desirability
of mutual agreement based on "equity" in delimiting the continental shelf
boundaries. A joint committee of Iranians and Saudi Arabians was formed to
study and consider such a settlement plan. Additionally, Saudi Arabia entered
into an agreement in 1958 with Bahrain to split evenly the Abu Safoi offshore
area.
12 Francis T. Christy, Jr., in his June 8, 1967, speech at the American Bar
Association National Institute on Marine Resources, at Long Beach, California,
"Alternative Regimes for the Minerals of the Sea Floor," pointed out that the
Convention's open-ended compromise simply postponed the day of decision.
At some point before mid-ocean there must be demarcation of a clear-cut limit.
International Lawyer, Vol. 2,
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contour which marks that depth, "x," or to the line which marks the
new distance, "y," whichever gives the greater width. But let us get
rid of the exploitability concept, the rubber boundary notion, altogether. Of course, no matter how the new boundary is defined, the
present distinction between exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state
with respect to the seabed, and the high-seas character of the overlying
water column and water surface, must be retained. So also with the
free status of the airspace above. Boundary problems would naturally
be intensified by any seaward extension of coastal jurisdiction, but the
mechanism for settling them is already stated in Article 6."
II.
The foregoing suggestions deal with one side of the coin, the
redefinition of the line which limits the coastal nation's exclusive
jurisdiction. The other side of the coin remains: What about submarine resources beyond the limit of the coastal state's exclusive
jurisdiction, howsoever defined? This is the problem which may be
confronted first-if the Russian proposal is seriously debated in late
1967. First, let us recognize the existence of a gray area. Exploratory
drilling is now being planned in water depths exceeding 4,000 feet,
several hundred miles offshore, and the United States Government
has issued permits to U.S. nationals covering these operations.1

It is

almost as necessary to clarify the jurisdiction over these ventures in
their exploration stage, as it will be later on if they strike oil. Shall
such clarification come about by a redefinition of the coastal state's
exclusive seabed jurisdiction, or by evolution of a regime governing
exploitation of minerals beneath the high seas? Probably the latter.
Three general groups of opinion have been advanced with respect
to the regimes, and the related substantive rights, which ought to
govern the exploitation of marine resources which are located beyond
the continental shelf:
(1) Indefinite extension of the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal
13 Article 6 provides that the boundary between common continental shelves
of two or more opposite or adjacent states shall be determined by agreement
between them. In absence of agreement and special circumstances, the boundary is the "median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest
points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each
State is measured."
14 The Department of the Interior has published Outer Continental Shelf
Leasing Maps which cover the ocean bottom to depths as great as 6,000 feet
and extend as far as 100 miles off the Southern California coast. See also
Note 3, supra.
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nations, even to mid-ocean, or to the point of contact with similar
expansion by overseas nations-in effect, dividing up the seabottom
somewhat as Pope Alexander VI divided up the surface, except that
his club had more limited membership. I will not spend further time
on this, except to say that this notion constitutes one more reason for
getting rid of the exploitability phase of the continental shelf boundary, because that is the premise of this proposal.
(2) Administration by the United Nations, or some other international authority, perhaps related thereto. 5 I will come back to that.
(3) Treatment of mineral resources which are beyond the limits
of the coastal state's exclusive seabed jurisdiction (howsoever those
limits are defined) as open to appropriation and exploitation under
the laws of the flag of the discovering expedition. 6
It seems to me that the last is the most sensible of these three
proposals, and will be so for a long time to come. There is plenty of
room on the world's deep seabeds. The maximum exploratory effort
by all nations, the maximum interchange of information, should be
encouraged. When a discovery is made, it will, as a matter of course,
be exploited under the laws of the flag of the discovering nation,
absent an agreement by that nation to the contrary. If expeditions
from too many nations cluster too closely to the honey pot, the resulting disputes, initially at least, are going to be settled by accommodation
among the competing states, or by the evolution of adversary case
law. There already exists a respectable, if incomplete, body of international law relevant to such disputes. For example, our Government
has always recognized the principle that uses of the high seas must
be exercised with due regard for the similar rights of others, but we
have also asserted the fundamental right and obligation of this nation,
like all nations, to protect the lawful activities of its nationals abroad.'
",,
See Notes 1, 4, supra.
16 Cf. the writer's papers, "The Laws Governing Exploitation of the Minerals
Beneath the Sea," New York Section, American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical and Petroleum Engineers, New York, New York, January 13, 1966, and
"The Administration of Mineral Resources Underlying the High Seas," American Bar Association National Institute on Marine Resources, Long Beach,
California, June 8, 1967.
'1 President Truman, in his 1945 Continental Shelf Proclamation, stipulated
that the freedom of the surface waters overlying the Continental Shelf of the
United States beyond the territorial sea be maintained as high seas. President
Johnson recently reaffirmed the United States position that freedom of both
the high seas and the lands underlying them be maintained when he stated
that "under no circumstances must we ever allow the prospects of rich harvest
and mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 2
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This includes exclusive national jurisdiction over vessels flying the
national flag, even in foreign territorial waters, and, a fortiori, on the
high seas. To be specific, the same principle should apply to an
American oil well located on a sea mount as to an American vessel
loading oil from it. To turn to another example, our country recognized prescriptive rights in the seabed, acquired by exploration, long
before the concept of the continental shelf jurisdiction was born. In
short, there is in existence enough international law to provide the
framework for solution of any conflicts likely to develop soon over
the seabed beneath the high seas. It is quite possible that the discussions which the Russians have invited may prove constructive in bringing about general agreement on principles of the sort just discussed,
and their amplification, so that each nation may proceed with its own
explorations under its own laws, recognizing the correlative rights of
other nations to do the same thing.
Beyond that, if a convention on this subject is negotiated, it
should be limited to the working level, mutual accommodation, exchange of information type. It might perhaps encompass creation of
arbitration or conciliation machinery to deal with such disputes as
may arise.
But it is far too early to agree on the factors that are usually
written into mining laws, such as the area and duration of mineral
concessions. A fortiori, no international agency needs now to be
created to administer deep sea mining laws that we cannot yet write.
Above all, we should not now cede to any international agency
whatsoever the power to veto American exploration of areas of the
deep sea which are presently open to American initiative.
We can give away later what we now keep, but the converse is
sadly false.
maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the
lands under the high seas. We mu'st ensure that the deep seas and the ocean
bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings."
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